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  • Fabrice Thill, "Hidden Service Tracking Detection and Bandwidth Cheating in Tor Anonymity Network" Master Thesis (PDF). This project was supervised by Alex Biryukov, advised by Ivan Pustogarov, September, 2014.
This work focuses on Tor and has two contributions: 1. A method of detecting tracking attacks on hidden services as well as an implementation. By analyzing 39841 hidden services addresses for the year 2013 we found that at least 50 tor relays were conducting tracking attacks on a total of 45 hidden services. 2. An attack on the Tor bandwidth measurements protocol in order to obtain higher chances of being chosen for a client path, the implementation reaching a 1% probability to be chosen as an Exit node on the Tor network and the 21st highest relay, in terms of bandwidth weight, out of 5.834 active relays, while using a bandwidth only 50 KB/s.