



Impossibility Results for Indifferentiability with Resets


Atul Luykx, Elena Andreeva, Bart Mennink, and Bart Preneel
KU Leuven

ESC 2013 — January 18, 2012

Indifferentiability



Indifferentiability




Definition

Functionality φ_1 is **at least as secure** as φ_2 if for any distinguisher D and adversary \mathcal{A}_1 there exist adversary \mathcal{A}_2 such that

$$|\Pr(D_{\varphi_1}^{\mathcal{A}_1} \rightarrow 1) - \Pr(D_{\varphi_2}^{\mathcal{A}_2} \rightarrow 1)| \text{ is small}$$

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- Original framework of Maurer et al. (MRH, TCC'04)
- Popularized for domain extenders by Coron et al. (CDMP, Crypto'05)

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“security against all generic attacks”

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(knows: m)

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
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


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


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


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- Secure in ROM, but insecure for some indifferentiable hash functions

Remarks



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Remarks

- The attack of RSS **does not mean** there is a fault in the indistinguishability framework!
- Indistinguishability is general enough due to MRH's random systems
- Issue comes from CDMP's definition that does not allow distinguishers to manipulate states
- All indistinguishability proofs following CDMP's model limit types of distinguishers (their power) that are covered


Reset-Indifferentiability

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
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- RSS: impossibility of reset-indifferentiable one-pass domain extenders
 - Applies to MD, chopMD, pfMD, EMD, Sponge, ...
- Model is **too strong**


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- Our approach: explicitly model communication between adversaries
 - Storage procedures for any pair of adversaries
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
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- Model allows for **whole spectrum** of indifferentiability notions
- k -stage distinguishers
 - **1-stage**: regular indifferentiability
 - CRP is **2-stage**

\mathcal{G} -Indifferentiability

- Let \mathcal{G} be a class of distinguishers
- E.g.: 1-stage, 1-stage + CRP, 2-stage, ...
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There exists *n-stage* distinguisher D such that $\forall \mathcal{A}$:

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where \mathcal{A} makes q RO-queries, D makes one message evaluation

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Impossibility of Reset-Indifferentiability: Proof Idea

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Proof Idea

- Distinguisher evaluates oracles for some $m \in \{0, 1\}^M$
- Resets before every \mathcal{A} -call
- At last \mathcal{A} -call: learns at most $a \ll M$ bits of m

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Proof Idea

- Distinguisher D is a combination of two distinguishers P and Q
 - If F is “roughly” one-pass: previous distinguisher (call it P) works
 - Otherwise, new distinguisher Q : manipulates m in a sophisticated way
- Distinguisher D chooses m runs either P or Q (depending on m)

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- DGHM's work:
 - Focus on reductions between “resources”
 - Target impossibility results
- Our work:
 - Focus on indifferentiability as way to guarantee security against a variety of attacks
 - More suitable to discover possibilities for composition
 - It shows that there are many different notions to consider

Conclusions

- Indifferentiability framework comes with a range of subtleties
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Thank you for your attention!