

Farfalle and KRAVATTE

Parallel permutation-based cryptography

Guido BERTONI¹ Joan DAEMEN^{1,2} Michaël PEETERS¹
Gilles VAN ASSCHE¹ Ronny VAN KEER¹

¹STMicroelectronics

²Radboud University

Early Symmetric Crypto 2017

Outline

- 1 A PRF with incrementality
- 2 Farfalle
- 3 Caracolle
- 4 KRAVATTE
- 5 High-order differentials on Falle

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Incrementality

$$F_k \left(M^{(0)} \right)$$

Incrementality

$$F_k \left(M^{(1)} \circ M^{(0)} \right)$$

Incrementality

$$F_k \left(M^{(2)} \circ M^{(1)} \circ M^{(0)} \right)$$

Incrementality

$$F_k \left(M^{(m-1)} \circ \dots \circ M^{(2)} \circ M^{(1)} \circ M^{(0)} \right)$$

Session authenticated encryption (SAE)

Initialization taking nonce $N \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$

$T \leftarrow 0^t + F_k(N)$

history $\leftarrow N$

return tag $T \in \mathbb{Z}_2^t$

Wrap taking metadata $A \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ and plaintext $P \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$

$C \leftarrow P + F_k(A \circ \text{history})$

$T \leftarrow 0^t + F_k(C \circ A \circ \text{history})$

history $\leftarrow C \circ A \circ \text{history}$

return ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{|P|}$ and tag $T \in \mathbb{Z}_2^t$

Synthetic initialization value (SIV)

Wrap taking metadata $A \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ and plaintext $P \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$

$T \leftarrow 0^t + F_k(P \circ A)$

$C \leftarrow P + F_k(T \circ A)$

return ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{|P|}$, tag $T \in \mathbb{Z}_2^t$

Unwrap taking metadata $A \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$, ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ and tag $T \in \mathbb{Z}_2^t$

$P \leftarrow C + F_k(T \circ A)$

$T' \leftarrow 0^t + F_k(P \circ A)$

if $T' = T$ **then**

return plaintext $P \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{|C|}$

else

return error!

Wide block cipher (WBC)

Encipher taking key $k \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$, tweak $W \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ and plaintext $P \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$

$(L, R) \leftarrow \text{split}(P, r)$

$R_0 \leftarrow R_0 + H_k(L \circ 0)$ (R_0 : the first $\min(b, |R|)$ bits of R)

$L \leftarrow L + F_k(R \circ W \circ 1)$

$R \leftarrow R + F_k(L \circ W \circ 0)$

$L_0 \leftarrow L_0 + H_k(R \circ 1)$ (L_0 the first $\min(b, |L|)$ bits of L)


$C \leftarrow L || R$

return ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{|P|}$


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A first attempt



Far + Falle



Farfalle-PRF

- **Key schedule:**

$K \in \mathbb{Z}_2^*$ gets mapped to $k \leftarrow H_{0^b}(K)$

- **Then:**

$$F_k(M^{(m-1)} \circ \dots \circ M^{(1)} \circ M^{(0)}, n)$$

with **Far:** $H_k(\cdot)$ – **Farfalle:** $F_k(\cdot)$

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The caracolles rolling function

- LFSR on last e bits of the state

$$\text{caracolles}(k, i) = \left(k(x) \times x^i \right) \bmod p(x)$$

- Goal: avoid affine spaces of high dimension

How long before an affine space appears?

$$L_{\min}(p(x), d) = \min_n : \{\text{caracolles}(k, i) | 0 \leq i < n\} \supset \text{affine dim. } d$$

| d | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| $e = 13, \text{ est.}$ | $2^{5.2}$ | $2^{8.5}$ | $2^{10.5}$ | $2^{11.7}$ | $2^{12.3}$ | $2^{12.7}$ |
| $e = 13, \text{ meas.}$ | $2^{5.5}$ | $2^{8.5}$ | $2^{10.5}$ | $2^{11.6}$ | - | - |
| $e = 17, \text{ est.}$ | $2^{6.5}$ | $2^{10.8}$ | $2^{13.4}$ | 2^{15} | $2^{15.9}$ | $2^{16.4}$ |
| $e = 17, \text{ meas.}$ | $2^{6.9}$ | $2^{10.4}$ | $2^{13.3}$ | - | - | - |
| $e = 29, \text{ est.}$ | $2^{10.5}$ | $2^{17.6}$ | $2^{22.2}$ | 2^{25} | $2^{26.8}$ | $2^{27.8}$ |
| $e = 29, \text{ meas.}$ | $2^{10.2}$ | $2^{17.4}$ | - | - | - | - |
| $e = 61, \text{ est.}$ | $2^{21.2}$ | 2^{36} | $2^{45.7}$ | 2^{52} | $2^{55.7}$ | 2^{58} |
| $e = 61, \text{ meas.}$ | $> 2^{20.0}$ | - | - | - | - | - |

$$e = \deg(p(x))$$

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KRAVATTE = Farfalle with KECCAK- p


- $f = \text{KECCAK-}p[1600, n_r = 6]$
- $r = 1536$ bits
- $\text{caracolle}(k, i)$ with dense $p(x)$ of degree 61
- $i < 2^{56}$
- Target security: 128 bits (claimed capacity of 256 bits)

But...


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
Far + Falle



Far ++ Falle (work in progress)



Plan for KRAVATTE



$$f_{\text{Far}} = \text{KECCAK-}p[1600, n_r = 6]$$

$$f_{\text{f}} = \text{KECCAK-}p[1600, n_r = 4]$$

$$f_{\text{alle}} = \text{KECCAK-}p[1600, n_r = 4]$$

Thanks for your attention!

See

IACR ePrint **2016/1188**

for more details and references.